Tag Archives: ruling

Motherless doesn’t exist

I was pleased to see coverage of a recent surrogacy dispute in the mainstream media last week. Pro-surrogacy lobbyists say these cases are rare but we cannot be sure of this. The family court is closed to the public and it is only with the judges’ permission that details of a case be released to the press. It was Julie Bindel who sought permission to write on the case of Z (the child) and her article was published in The Critic in June, with the mainstream press picking it up in The Times, The Telegraph and the Daily last week, so it it feels like a good time to revisit this particular case.

I am limited in what I can share for obvious reasons, but I can say that I am honoured to know and support the surrogate mother from when we met 3 years ago to today. She is the picture of dignity and strength in incredibly challenging circumstances.

When such disputes happen there are lifelong consequences for all involved. Perhaps what pro-surrogacy lobbyists mean is that it rare for judges in the family court to rule in favour of the surrogate mother. Such as this case where the commissioning parents were not entirely honest about a condition one of them suffered from and the surrogate mother wanted to withdraw her consent as she considered them to be unsuitable parents. The child was placed in foster care.

Or the case of a surrogate mother who, as she already had a large family and with no genetic connection to the child, the judge decided that the commissioning couple should retain custody. The surrogate mother is allowed to visit the child 6 times a year. (Significantly, in this case, the court notes state that a parental order “tells one nothing about what the best welfare arrangements for the child will be after birth.”)

We know of UK cases where there is significant pressure on a surrogate mother to agree to the parental order and situations when her consent is not forthcoming it can be ‘dispensed with’. Marie Anne wrote of her experience and told us that counsel for commissioning parents argued that because a UK surrogate mother had tragically died and was therefore unable to give her consent, so should she, a very much alive surrogate mother, have her consent dispensed with. (It’s likely that the wider public wouldn’t believe this unless they read about it in the papers or heard it on the news, but coverage of Marie Anne’s case was wholly positive at the time.)

These cases are complex and I am not a lawyer, but my reading of the case of Z it is that the commissioning parents had the early intention to remove the mother from their lives once they got what they wanted; the child. It was never their intention to have her as an extended family member, despite what they promised. The court proceedings made it clear that commissioning couple didn’t want a mother in Z’s life, there was “no vacancy to fill” and G, the surrogate mother was referred to as “just an egg donor”.

By applying this reductive, dehumanising language and failing to acknowledge reality and her role as mother, their aim to sever the connection with her child was made starkly clear.

Some say that G could have changed her mind and kept her son but once ‘signed up’ to surrogacy, it is very difficult to back out. It’s not a matter of simply changing your mind. You are pregnant with child you are told is not yours.

Whilst within the legal limits, a surrogate mother can access an abortion in the UK, but an article from New Zealand, where the laws are similar to ours, a woman terminated her surrogacy pregnancy and a politician (with now two surrogate born babies) put forward a private members Bill. The wording of which alludes to access for abortion in a surrogacy pregnancy possibly coming under threat.

“Labour MP Tāmati Coffey, who, with his partner Tim Smith, welcomed their son Tūtānekai by surrogate in 2019, currently has a members’ bill in ballot calling for modern laws for modern families. It includes reform of birth certificates, providing a way to enforce surrogacy arrangements and creating a register of potential surrogates.”

Outrageously, accusations of homophobia were made of G. In my view this (along with a legal argument of human rights) this was done to garner sympathy, claim victimhood and tarnish G as bigoted. If a woman was homophobic would she seek to engage in having a baby for a same-sex couple? No.

Whilst social services were in support of the two men the clinical psychologist in the case said “The fathers…claimed that they are a ‘motherless’ family” and it is from here we get the title of this blog: “Motherless’ doesn’t exist.”

Ultimately the judge ruled in the best interests of the child and that was for the child to know his mother and have an ongoing relationship. It is an unprecedented decision where “free and unconditional consent that is required by section 54(6) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008” was central to the ruling.

Had all parties stuck to the original agreement then the situation would undoubtedly be entirely different for the adults and more importantly, very different for the child. But the State cannot legislate to force a friendships in any form and this case demonstrates how the ‘friendship’ was temporary, one sided and transactional. It was not based on the natural-founded and enduring friendships we are led to believe is common in surrogacy.

Readers should be reminded that reform proposals seek to introduce a model of commercial surrogacy where a pre-birth order transfers the parental rights at birth. The mother gives her consent to transfer her parental rights before the birth but she is not required to confirm her consent afterwards. The Law Commissions of England and Wales and Scotland found this to ‘disrespect’ her autonomy:

“A requirement for further consent after birth also suggests that the surrogate’s consent before conception is not adequate, which does not respect her autonomy.” ~ Law Commission’s Core Report, Page 37.

But as we know from this case, a lot can change between conception and birth.

With the ‘cooling-off period‘ (which I use deliberately as a contractual term) much reduced from 6 months to just 6 weeks after the birth, a surrogate mother has much less time to raise the alarm, decide to try to reclaim her parental rights or instruct lawyers. Under the Law Commission’s preferred model her name has already been removed from the birth certificate. Her name, rights and role in the child’s identity documents, knowledge of their relatives and experience of their family has been erased from the outset.

Thankfully, this is not the case for Z who will know his mother but it would have been very different had reform been in place at the time.

We would like to thank the legal team who supported G and we invite anyone who is or knows a surrogate mother with regret to contact us